Abstract-Following monetary union with West Germany in 1990, the real wage of East German workers rose 83%. I use the German SocioEconomic Panel data to investigate the determinants of wage growth, and assess whether they are consistent with efficient restructuring. Although job-changing rates were initially high, the share of wage growth that accrued to movers was little higher than in the west, suggesting that the incentives to move were too low. For 1990 to 1991, the biggest gainers were low-wage workers generally, and women and the less-educated specifically. For 1991 to 1996, the biggest gainers were women and the better-educated.
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I. Introduction
F OLLOWING monetary union with West Germany in July 1990, the median real monthly consumption wage of East German workers aged 18 to 54 rose by 83% in six years. On the other hand, the employment rate fell from 89% to 73% for this age group. Several papers have examined the change in returns to various characteristics using cross-sectional wage data, but this paper is the first to use longitudinal data to examine this extraordinary wage growth. It is a necessary condition for employment recovery that the distribution of wage gains be conducive to restructuring-away from heavy and poor-quality manufacturing, towards services and more modern manufacturing. The longitudinal approach permits an assessment of this by assigning wage growth to job movers and job stayers, and by analyzing the relation between wage growth and interindustry job changes. The longitudinal data also provide a clearer picture of which groups have had wage gains, because returns to characteristics in successive cross sections are significantly affected by selection, due to the employment fall. 1 In this paper, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1990-1996 to examine year-to-year wage growth. I measure the extent of job-changing and the gains from job-changing, and the relation between wage growth and individual characteristics. I also measure to what degree East Germans have benefitted from working in the west, and investigate mean-reversion in wage dynamics. I make comparisons with West Germany.
An economy undergoing a successful transition would initially have high moving rates and high returns to moving, both of which would fall as the transition progressed. Much of the gain from moving would be explained by industry changes. The fact that employment in East Germany has not recovered from the initial shock suggests that insufficient restructuring (and hence insufficient mobility) may have taken place. The large initial wage gap between east and west should allow job-taking in the west to be an important component of early wage growth. 2
II. Background
Under communism, base wages were set centrally and coarsely guided by the education, experience, and industry of the worker, although in practice adjustment could be made at the firm level. 3 Wages therefore did reflect skill. Monetary union between East and West Germany took place on July 1, 1990. (Some economic changes had been occurring earlier in 1990, but monetary union marked the beginning of East Germany's shock therapy.) The western labor unions established a bargaining system based on the western system and were able to negotiate large wage increases with their bargaining partners in the initially unprivatized firms. Beginning in 1993, however, as economic conditions continued to be poor, employers were able to slow wage growth, and in many cases even left the bargaining system altogether.
The unions were not necessarily interested in the welfare of easterners only, although east-west equity was one of their concerns. Other aims may have included restraining migration from east to west and preventing eastern firms from undercutting western prices. Wage rises, and the resulting rise in unemployment benefits, could have helped firms initially by inducing workers to cooperate with efficiency-enhancing employment reductions. 4 Eastern GDP per capita for the first half of 1997 was 57% of the western figure, measured in current prices, and the monthly earnings ratio was approximately 75%. 5 It has been common to ascribe the employment decline to the wage rises, and some analysts have called for wage subsidies to offset this. 6 Labor unions counter that wage increases are beneficial, because the incentives to invest in human capital have been raised. 7
III. Econometric Model
I model year-to-year wage growth as
The difficulty with any model of a transition economy is that the correct model changes over time. Inspection of regressions run on each pair of years suggested that the biggest difference was between 1990 and 1991 and the subsequent years. I therefore estimate equation
(1) for 1990-1991 and for the pooled pairs of years 1991-1996. The error term u it will not have a simple structure, and in the pooled regressions I therefore adjust the standard errors to allow for correlation between observations on the same person. I estimate these equations using median regression, to reduce sensitivity to outliers. I report bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 repetitions.
IV. Data
The data I use are from respondents to the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) who resided in East Germany when that region was first surveyed in June 1990, immediately before monetary union. These individuals were followed if they moved to the west. The sample includes workers 18-54 with nonzero hours, including those in public works jobs, who were not working in agriculture, self-employed, or apprentices. I construct a comparable sample for West Germans. 8 The principal wage I use is gross earnings in the month prior to the interview, not adjusted for end-of-year bonuses. I deflate wages according to residence in the east or west to give real consumption wages of comparable purchasing power. 9 I also create an hourly wage using the monthly wage and usual weekly hours, but, as the hours variable is noisy, this wage measure is less preferred.
I classify as "involuntary movers" respondents who reported that they had been fired or laid off since the previous interview, or that their firm had closed. Respondents who had moved within the firm or experienced a firm takeover I classify as "stayers." All other movers I group as voluntary movers, which means that this category probably contains more misclassified individuals. Table 1 shows the means of the variables for the eastern and western samples. Annual growth in eastern real monthly wages was an enormous twenty log points in 1990-1991, and averaged a still large nine log points in 1991-1996, compared with an average of four log points in the western sample. 10,11 Fewer eastern workers have tertiary education than in the west, but fewer have no qualification beyond general schooling. In both regions, the most common degree is the dual-system apprenticeship, which is completed after general schooling. An alternative or sometimes additional vocational qualification can be obtained with classroom study only, and this group is higher paid (Hunt, forthcoming) .
V. Descriptive Statistics
The big net flow of workers to the west (this includes both those moving residence and those merely taking up a commuter job) occurred early on, and eastern job-changing generally was higher earlier, and higher than in the west. The cumulative effect of the east-west difference over six years is large: of those working in both 1990 and 1996, 70% in the west (but only 40% in the east) had reported each year that they had 2 See Sorm and Terrell (1999) for a positive assessment of the Czech restructuring experience. Boeri and Flinn (1999) find lower mobility rates in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary than in Italy.
3 Krueger and Pischke (1995) . 4 Blanchard (1997) . 5 GDP figures come from the Bundesbank Web page (www.bundesbank. de). Population and earnings ratio figures come from the Statistisches Bundesamt Web page (www.statistik-bund.de/presse/deutsch/pm/p7366042.htm).
6 Bedau (1996) , Begg and Portes (1993) , Bellmann (1994) . 7 See Burda and Funke (1996) for a model assessing this.
8 The public-use GSOEP sample is described by Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer (1993) .
9 See Krause (1994) . The 1990 price level for the east is not considered as reliable as in subsequent years.
10 Numbers reported for the west, other than regression coefficients, are computed using the GSOEP weights, which make a big difference due to oversampling of western foreigners. The western immigrant sample added to the survey in 1994 is dropped.
11 For western log wages, there is a big difference between the average of the individual changes and the change in the average. Average western wages grew only about 4% from 1990 to 1996. stayed with the same employer. 12 Table 2 shows the median change in log monthly wages by mover status.
The sample may be used to calculate the proportion of wage growth that is attributable to movers. The total wage growth in the sample is computed by adding the absolute real wage increase in DM between pairs of years for all the observations. For each observation, the wage gain may be attributed to a stay, a job change within the east, or a move to working in the west (or returning from the west). Over the whole 1990-1996 period, only 18% of the wage growth is due to job changes within the east, and 7% is due to movement between east and west. Only for 1990-1991 is the total share of changers considerably higher, due to the larger gains from moving west (15% due to job changes in the east, and 18% due to movement to the west). A similar calculation for the west reveals that 22% of wage growth is due to job changes. This suggests incentives to change jobs in the east have not been high enough. 13 Table 3 shows median regressions for eastern wage growth for the 1990-1991 period. In column 1, the coefficient on the female dummy is insignificant, while the coefficient on age is negative and significant although small: an age difference of ten years implies a 1.2 log point (or about 1.2%) difference in wage growth. The coefficients on the education dummies indicate that wage gains were inversely proportional to education: those with vocational training had 5% lower wage growth, the university group had 8% lower growth, and the small, poorly educated, general-schooling group had 10% higher wage growth.
VI. Results

A. Eastern Sample
The coefficient on change in tenure in column 1 is negative (indicating beneficial effects of a job change) but insignificant. By contrast, a move to the west (without taking the loss of tenure into account) increased wages by a massive 42 log points.
In column 2, I replace tenure in 1991 with direct information on whether a worker moved or not. Voluntary movers gained a statistically significant 14 log points. Moving to the west is controlled for, and so the magnitude indicates the gain to changing employer within the east. The coefficient on involuntary moving is insignificant. 14 The coefficient on moving west indicates a 36 log-point gain. The coefficients on the moving dummies should not be interpreted as the return to an exogenous move by a random worker, because voluntary and involuntary movers are likely to be unobservably different from each other and from stayers. In the specification of column 2 (as in the others in the table), the coefficient on tenure in 1990 is insignificant.
The addition of industry dummies in column 3 makes the female dummy positive and significant, indicating 4% higher wage growth for women compared to men in the same industry. It also makes the education coefficients smaller and less significant. I have run a regression in which I add dummies for the worker's 1991 industry to the covariates of this column 3 specification. (These results are not reported.) This renders the coefficient on moving voluntarily very small and insignificant, indicating that all the benefit of moving is coming from changing industry.
In column 4, the dependent variable is the hourly wage. The returns to moving are lower for hourly wages, which suggests that movers may have increased their hours relative to stayers, the latter having perhaps been put on short-time. The coefficient on log monthly wage is negative and extremely significant in column 5. The coefficient implies that a 10% higher initial wage is associated with a 3.3 log-point lower wage growth, which is a substantial magnitude. This coefficient is discussed further below. 15 Together, the 1990-1991 results are consistent with efficient restructuring: moving rates were high, gains from moving were high, and the gains were due principally to moves to higher-paying industries.
In table 4, I repeat the regressions of table 3 for the observations on the pooled pairs of years from 1991 to 1996, with year dummies added to all the regressions, and a dummy indicating whether the worker was in the west in the initial year of the pair. Such workers would get only western wage growth, which is lower.
The female dummy is positive and significant in the regressions which do not control for the wage. This is consistent with the finding 12 For U.S. male household heads, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) report yearly job-changing rates of 13%.
13 U.S. decompositions take into account that movers would have had wage growth had they not moved. McCue (1996) reports that separations account for approximately 20% of wage growth for white men, but less than half this amount for other groups.
14 The "voluntary moving" category probably contains misclassified involuntary movers, and its coefficient is therefore probably biased toward zero. The "involuntary movers" category probably has few misclassified workers. 15 Controlling for the wage causes the coefficients on gender and education to flip sign. This presumably indicates that, amongst those with a similar wage in 1990, males and the well-educated were more likely to be experiencing a temporary bad draw and hence to improve in the next period. a. In the first column the mean of differenced variables is the mean of the 1990-1991 difference. In the second column the mean of the 1991-1992, 1992-1993, etc ., differences are given. Undifferenced means refer to the first of the pair of years.
b. Western means are weighted with sample weights. by Hunt (forthcoming) that, although the male-female wage gap is being closed partly through the exit from employment of low-paid women, some of the closing is genuinely beneficial to those women remaining employed. The coefficient on age is negative and significant across the specifications, but small. In column 5, the coefficient on the log wage in the initial year of the pair is lower for than for 1990-1991. The coefficients on the education dummies are somewhat different from those in the 1990-1991 regressions, because in column 1 through 3 it is university graduates who appear to experience significantly larger wage gains than the omitted apprenticeship graduates. The magnitude is smaller than the educational differences found for 1990-1991. As for the earlier period, the education dummies are weakened by the addition of industry dummies in column 3 and 4. Over the whole 1990-1996 period, therefore, tertiary education graduates have gained relative to apprentices, but those with general schooling have also had relative gains and those with vocational training have not. These results are consistent with the cross-sectional literature.
Workers in the west in the initial year have 4% to 6% lower wage growth. The coefficient on change in tenure (column 1) is insignificant. In the other columns of table 4, initial tenure has a positive and generally insignificant coefficient. The bonus achieved by moving to the west fell over time, as wages in the west rose a little and wages in the east rose a lot-and this is reflected in the much smaller coefficient on the dummy for moving to the west in 1991-1996, indicating wage growth of 5% to 6%. Due to the fall in the point estimates, these coefficients are in fact statistically insignificant. 16 In this period, amongst movers to the west, stayers (workers transferred to the western plant of a parent firm) are more common than are voluntary or involuntary movers. Analysis not reported indicates that these transferred workers have no wage gain, while voluntary movers to the west have statistically significant gains.
The coefficients on voluntary and involuntary moves in column 2 through 4 are also generally insignificant. The point estimates indicate that the wage-growth advantage of voluntary movers over stayers has fallen greatly from 6%-14% in 1990-1991 to only 0%-3% here. Furthermore, involuntary movers now have a median wage growth 1%-5% below that of stayers in column 2 through 4. (The difference is significant in column 2.) The results suggest that incentives to move have become small, and that restructuring has stopped short of the goal of a successful transition.
B. Western Sample
The results for column 3 and 4 in tables 3 and 4 may be compared with the results for the western sample in column 1 and 2 of table 5. Wage-growth differences by educational group are smaller in the west, and there is no gender difference. Voluntary movers gain 4% to 5% in the west, more than in the later eastern period, while western involuntary moving losses are similar to those of the later eastern period, but also insignificant. 17 Column 3 shows that the coefficient on the monthly wage is much smaller for the west than it is for the east (Ϫ0.045 versus Ϫ0.33 and Ϫ0.20 in table 3 and 4). The coefficient on the log wage will be biased down by measurement error. In unreported regressions, I have experimented with instrumenting with the wage lagged twice. (This involves using mean regression, reducing the sample size, and using the retrospective 1989 wage.) The eastern 1990-1991 coefficient is almost unchanged by instrumenting at Ϫ0.32, which is twice the 1991-1996 coefficient, and four times the western coefficient. Further unreported regressions indicate that the east-west difference is due to stayers. This strong mean-reversion in eastern wages cannot be captured in cross-sectional analysis, which shows that overall wage inequality rose slightly.
The lower persistence of wage differentials for eastern stayers probably reflects disequilibrium as firms change the tasks they perform and change how they match workers and tasks as they learn more about both. Mean reversion may be highest in 1990-1991 because this disequilibrium was greatest at that time. An alternative interpretation is that mean reversion was higher early due to the employment decline occurring then, which was greatest for the less-skilled (Hunt, forthcoming) . A larger employment fall for the less-skilled was to be expected in a recession, and the few survivors were likely to be workers that had been undervalued by communism, who then experienced large relative wage rises. Mean reversion could also reflect compression of wages by labor unions. It seems more likely, though, that this effect would be reflected in the variance of the component of wage growth not associated with mean reversion. 16 The corresponding coefficients in mean regressions are significant. 17 Bender, Dustmann, and Meghir (1998) find displaced West German males who were reemployed within a year had only a 2% relative daily wage loss, and Burda and Mertens (1998) have similar results for this group. Zimmermann (1998) finds West German males who change firms have 5% lower yearly growth in monthly wages, controlling for occupation change. 
VI. Conclusions
Sixty percent of eastern workers changed jobs between 1990 and 1996, compared to thirty percent of western workers, which would appear to indicate a large amount of restructuring. But in spite of this high mobility, only 25% of eastern wage growth was attributable to job changes, compared to 22% in the western sample. The high initial moving rates and gains from moving have fallen over time, both for within-east moves and moves to the west. The results suggest that wage-growth patterns after 1991 have not provided appropriate incentives to workers to move, which in turn may have impeded employment recovery.
For 1990-1991, the largest wage rises were for those with an initially low wage, women and the less-educated. The relationship between initial wage and wage growth is not as strong in later years, and the groups with the largest wage rises were women and those with tertiary education. The mean-reverting tendency of wages is much stronger than in the west, which probably reflects changing tasks and learning about matching tasks and workers within firms.
